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Introduction
Seifeddine Rezgui was a 23-year-old engineering student, 
clean-shaven and fond of football and break dancing. He 
had never travelled abroad. He was also the gunman 
behind the deadliest terrorist attack in Tunisian mod-
ern history, which left 39 tourists and himself dead at a 
seaside resort in Sousse in the summer of 2015. According 
to his shocked family and friends, Rezugi had previously 
expressed no interest in politics or religion and never 
showed signs of religious extremism. According to media 
reports, however, Rezugi was an avid user of social media. 
Directly before the attack, he shared a number of posts 
pledging allegiance to ISIS on his Facebook account.
How did ISIS manage to successfully recruit a person 
as ordinary as Rezugi and convince him to commit a 
terrorist attack on such a scale? There are a plethora of 
reasons why Tunisian men and women flock to join ISIS at 
home and abroad. Regardless of their diverse motivations, 
ISIS has shown itself to be highly effective at recruiting 
foreign and local fighters across borders, using sleek on-
line propaganda and social media platforms.
In Rezugi’s case, there is no evidence that he was in 
fact recruited online by ISIS, though he did make use 
of social media platforms. Nevertheless the threat of 
online recruitment and radicalization by Islamist terror-
ist groups remains very high. ISIS is one of the biggest 
threats to Tunisia’s stability and democratic consolidation 
as it is getting a stronger hold over parts of neighbor-
ing Libya. Following the attack in Sousse, the Tunisian 
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government called for a “war on terror” and urged the 
international community to cooperate on a global re-
sponse to the threat of ISIS. It passed a strong anti-terror 
law and promised to close in two weeks as many as eighty 
mosques whose imams were suspected of radicalizing 
local youths. What the response lacked was a set of robust 
comprehensive measures to fight the online – and offline – 
recruitment efforts of ISIS.
Youth Radicalization
Tunisia is the largest exporter of foreign fighters travel-
ling to the conflict zones of Iraq, Libya, and Syria to join 
such terrorist groups as the Islamic State and Jabhat Al 
Nusra. According to official figures, there are currently 
some six thousand Tunisian members of ISIS in Syria and 
Iraq. Unofficial numbers vary between three to seven 
thousand.1 When ISIS leaders urged its jihadist fighters to 
relocate to Libya, such calls have found ears in Tunisia. As 
they are “next door” and have relatively easily access to 
Libya, Tunisians constitute the largest number of fighters 
there.2
There is no average profile for the Tunisian fighter 
serving terrorist forces abroad. They come from all 
economic, social, and educational backgrounds. Some 
come from poor socioeconomic backgrounds, others from 
wealthy and highly educated families.3 The average age 
is between 18 and 35, their youth being perhaps the only 
feature they have in common. Seven hundred of these 
fighters are female.4
Why do Tunisian youths turn in large numbers to ter-
rorist groups such as ISIS? The answer is not a straightfor-
ward one. Before looking specifically at ISIS recruitment 
strategies and the shortcomings of the government’s 
response, it is important to examine the more general 
reasons for youth radicalization in Tunisia. 
The motivation behind the radicalization of Tuni-
sian youth must be examined in the larger political and 
economic context of Tunisia before and after the “Arab 
Spring” of late 2010 and early 2011. Under the authori-
tarian, corrupt rule of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, young 
people in Tunisia had for decades suffered from economic 
exclusion and high unemployment rates especially among 
young graduates.5 The mass protests of 2010–11 testify to 
their decades-old disenfranchisement. Even five years 
after after Ben Ali was deposed, however, the picture re-
mains grim. One year after the revolution, rates of unem-
ployment among male graduates increased from 15.8 per-
cent to 23.7 percent, while unemployment among female 
graduates went up from 32.9 percent to 43.8 percent.6 Five 
years on, the euphoria and optimism of the revolution has 
faded, and the status quo persists: high unemployment 
and lack of opportunities. Young people today have little 
faith in the government, and there is still a wide discon-
nect between state institutions and the population at 
large. A 2015 survey of Tunisian youth found that about 95 
percent do not trust the state or the police.7
Reading through interviews with young Tunisians, 
one conclusion seems inevitable: there is a strong sense 
of disappointment, hopelessness, and despair. Toppling 
the dictator Ben Ali did not change their socioeconomic 
realities. Into this vacuum of hope, ISIS injects a strong al-
ternative. A young man named Walid, when asked about 
friends who joined ISIS in Syria, commented: “They live 
better than us!” ISIS offers its fighters a home, a monthly 
stipend, and even multiple wives, he claimed. Another 
young Tunisian, Wissam, reported that his friend is “lead-
ing a truly nice, comfortable life” under ISIS.8 Walid and 
Wissam’s perspectives, although delusional, underline 
that the motivational factors for joining ISIS can include 
the desire for financial and material gains as well as 
power and status.9
Other crucial motivations are religious and political 
ideology and the craving on the part of young people for a 
sense of purpose and belonging. ISIS has stressed the nar-
rative that its fighters are the “protectors” of Islam – and 
Muslims – in the face of Western colonialism and collabo-
rating Arab rulers. 
After the revolution in Tunisia, the new government 
tolerated jihadist-Salafist discourse as part of its commit-
ment to freedom of expression and beliefs. Such discourse 
in fact further strengthened the message that jihad is a 
duty of Muslims in times of war, for example in the war in 
Syria. 
Hungry for change, young men and women fell victim 
to such narratives, only to be disappointed later. Friends 
and family of some of the Tunisian fighters have reported 
that they have often regretted going to Syria after discov-
ering a different reality. In fact, the number of returnee 
fighters to Tunisia is also the highest globally, standing 
at 650 fighters thus far.10 While this number could signal 
a threat that terrorism will be reimported home, the 
returnees are a very valuable source of information for 
learning more about the motivation behind radicalization 
and designing pro-active measures accordingly. For this 
to materialize, however, de-radicalization programs have 
to be in place to rehabilitate returnees, win their trust, 
give amnesties in return for their readiness to peacefully 
engage with society and to cooperate to prevent further 
radicalization.
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How Does ISIS Recruit?
ISIS recruits in Tunisia in two parallel ways. One method 
is to establish a recruiting point at a local mosque or 
center and start spreading their ideas through peer-to-
peer relations, families, and friends.11 It is often reported 
that more than one family member left to join ISIS abroad. 
In one case, an entire family from the rich middle-class 
Tunis suburb of La Marsa joined ISIS in Syria.12 The sec-
ond, more sophisticated way is through the Internet. The 
government’s clampdown on mosques and other spaces 
where jihadist recruitment traditionally occurred has 
made the Internet a safer space to recruit, especially 
since it remains largely beyond the radar of Tunisian 
authorities. 
As in other countries, online propaganda is core to 
ISIS’s recruitment strategy in Tunisia. The level of sophis-
tication of ISIS’s propaganda products, from its polished 
electronic newsletter Dapiq to photos of jihadists and cute 
kittens to the gruesome, high-quality videos of behead-
ings, speak volumes about the group’s digital communi-
cations capacities. ISIS spreads and “socializes” horror 
through YouTube videos, Facebook groups, and Twitter 
hashtags. Indeed, its members are avid users of Twitter. 
In a study done by the Brookings Institution, a mini-
mum of 46,000 Twitter accounts used by ISIS supporters 
existed in the period between September and December 
2014 alone. Interestingly, these accounts had a higher 
than average number of followers, with about 1,000 fol-
lowers each.13 
ISIS digital activity depends heavily on audiovisual 
campaigns. According to Javier Lesaca, a visiting re-
searcher at George Washington University, ISIS released 
845 videos between January 2014 and September 2015.14 
The videos show a high level of production value and pick 
up on modern cultural themes such as films and video 
games that resonate with a young global crowd. 
An observed strength of ISIS online propaganda is its 
refined and carefully targeted online messages. To target 
Tunisians, for example, ISIS uses tailored recruitment 
videos featuring Tunisian fighters speaking in Tunisian 
Arabic and displaying Tunisian symbols as they urge more 
Tunisians to join them in Syria, Iraq, and Libya or to carry 
out lone-wolf style terrorist attacks at home.15 
Examining the content more closely, one must not 
overlook the fact that ISIS portrays itself as a serious 
government. According to this narrative, it cares for its 
citizens, protects them, provides good services from 
healthcare to education, and ensures that social justice 
prevails in its newly captured lands. In other words: ISIS 
promises, ISIS delivers. One illustration of this is the “The 
Islamic State Report” – thus far issued four times – which 
explains how life runs under the fair and just rule of 
ISIS, from inspecting restaurants and distributing Zakat 
among the poor to protecting farmers.
This propaganda is used to attract potential recruits, 
which is the starting point of online recruitment. Accord-
ing to J.M. Berger, who has closely analyzed ISIS recruit-
ment tactics, the process happens in five consecutive 
steps. Following 1) discovery, ISIS recruiters 2) create a 
micro-community where they flood the potential recruit 
with attention and more material, 3) isolate the potential 
recruit through encouraging him to cut ties with other 
sources of information and input such as family and 
friends, 4) take the conversation to private communica-
tions using encrypted platforms and apps, and 5) probe 
what the new recruit could do (either traveling to join 
ISIS or carrying out lone-wolf style attacks at home) and 
encourage him/her to take this action.16
According to the Rescue Association of Tunisians 
Trapped Abroad (RATTA), the point of no return for the 
brainwashed recruit is the stage where he is so isolated 
that he only speaks to ISIS supporters. Radicalization 
is successful once the conversation with the recruit has 
gone private.17
The Response of the Tunisian Government
After three major terrorist attacks claimed by ISIS in 
2015, the Tunisian government’s declared “war on terror” 
included passing the controversial counterterrorism law 
of July 25, 2015, replacing an older law of 2003, which was 
used during Ben Ali’s rule to quash dissent and suppress 
freedom of expression, association, and assembly. Even 
though the new law contains a few improvements, Tuni-
sian civil society and activists decried it, claiming that 
it puts freedom of the press, freedom of expression, and 
other civil liberties at risk.18 The government closed down 
local mosques that were suspected of spreading extrem-
ism. It also opened and closed borders with Libya several 
times and imposed an occasional ban on citizen move-
ment and travel. 
The government also started to pay attention to cyber 
terrorism after jihadist and extremist groups mush-
roomed on Twitter and Facebook in the wake of the 
revolution. After terrorist attacks, many urged the gov-
ernment to block websites and pages that incite violence 
and terrorism. Noomane Fehri, the minister for commu-
nications, technologies, and digital economy, asserted 
that the government “will not adopt a policy of blocking 
websites whatever their danger to us because we believe 
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this solution is technologically useless,” and claimed that 
his ministry would continue to monitor such groups.19 
The ministry of interior and the ministry of communica-
tion have coordinated efforts to monitor and intercept 
jihadist cells that used online accounts to facilitate smug-
gling of fighters or to plan terrorist attacks. There are no 
official figures on how many of these operate in Tunisia, 
but according to local media reports, there have been 
more than 2,183 coordinated operations between the two 
ministries and Tunisian security forces to monitor these 
groups.
The government also announced that it would col-
laborate with social media companies to remove content 
that incites violence.20 Yet there has been no follow-up on 
this plan. Tunisia apparently made no official requests to 
Twitter to legally remove inciting content, and only one 
was made to Facebook.21 Despite the minister’s assur-
ances that there will be no censorship in Tunisia after the 
revolution, digital activists pointed out legal loopholes 
and vague definitions that give the government the pow-
ers of surveillance, infringing on the rights to privacy and 
data protection.22 
In early November 2016, a number of media sources 
reported that Tunisia’s National Security Council, headed 
by President Beji Caid Essebsi, signed a new national 
strategy to fight “terrorism and extremism.” Little detail 
has been revealed about the strategy, but according to an 
official statement, it is built around the four main pil-
lars of “prevention, protection, judicial proceedings and 
retaliation.”23
Recommendations
The response of the Tunisian government to the rising 
threat of youth radicalization by ISIS and other terrorist 
groups has thus far been inefficient and mostly reac-
tionary. A “whole of government approach” is urgently 
needed, one that departs from conventional modes of 
punishment and reaction and moves toward more sus-
tainable forms of prevention and reintegration of radical-
ized youth. The national strategy to combat terrorism and 
extremism that President Essebsi signed on November 
7, 2016 was, according to the presidential spokesperson, 
developed through different stages in cooperation with 
civil society. Aside from the stated purpose of pursuing 
“prevention, protection, monitoring and retaliation,” very 
little detail has been disclosed about the new strategy. 
The strategy should definitely include measures to 
combat ISIS propaganda online, while ensuring that new-
ly won civil rights will not be compromised or affected. 
There is indeed a fine line to walk between security issues 
and human rights, a matter that post-Ben Ali Tunisia 
must be particularly sensitive to. No government has 
the capacity or the authority to shut down all extremist 
online content, especially when ISIS has the agile ability 
to disappear and reappear quickly. Considering such 
ethical and technical limitations, one approach that could 
work would be to use online platforms proactively to help 
bridge the disconnect between the government and the 
population. With a high level of Facebook penetration 
among Tunisian youth, the government should utilize 
it to the fullest – as much as ISIS does. There are many 
examples from around the world of governments using 
social media for civic engagement. Crowdsourcing in 
policy-making is one option to “take part in brainstorm-
ing, discussing, developing, and even implementing deci-
sions that used to be the domain of political and expert 
elites.”24 Iceland used crowdsourcing for constitutional 
reform, the US federal government has drawn on it for 
national dialogues and participatory budgeting, and the 
UAE has used it for improving public services. Similar 
measures in Tunisia would lend the youth a voice and 
increase their sense of belonging to society and of being 
significant actors in their country. 
To be certain, online civic engagement cannot alone 
wipe out the threat of ISIS. It needs to be complemented 
by serious social, political, and economic reforms, by 
rigorous anti-corruption efforts, and by a sustained com-
mitment to transparency and accountability. Only such a 
comprehensive approach can counter radicalization. But 
until such a serious strategy is implemented, merely clos-
ing down mosques and banning Facebook pages will not 
suffice. 
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